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In a moment I will adopt the fiction that I do not know Elise, Tim, Christian, Marina, Fabio, Myka, and 
Fred. But before I do I will say that being read with such careful critical attention by six of my 
contemporaries, and one of our teachers, at a time when a half-century’s worth of capitalism’s chickens 
is coming home to roost, has been an unexpectedly moving experience. I am grateful to them. 
 
Elise Archias highlights a problem that is undertheorized in Autonomy, namely the role of sensuous 
experience in art. To clarify what is at stake, I will begin from where we unequivocally agree, and see 
how far we diverge from there. Archias knows infinitely more about art and conceptual art in particular 
than I do, so I will take her word that Sol LeWitt means it when he says that in conceptual art “the idea 
becomes a machine that makes the art.”  
This is not how artists or anyone else 
ordinarily proceed. (Not even Sol 
LeWitt; but that he thinks he does has 
consequences). The “idea” is not a 
separate “what” that precedes my doing 
or making something, but a modality of 
the action itself: it is what makes it an 
action, rather than just something that 
happens. I write this paragraph 
knowing that I am almost certain to 
revise it heavily later. (I did). During 
that later process of revision, I will be 
changing my words to realize better the 
“idea,” which I can provisionally name—
as I conceive it now, it is to clarify the 
differences, if any, between Archias’s 
theoretical coordinates and my own—but which I cannot produce in advance of the paragraph itself. As 
I begin to write my response to Archias, I suspect those differences will turn out to be small, but I will 
not really know that until I work through the issues in writing; until I work through, that is, a whole 
welter of structures (linguistic, logical, historical, and rhetorical, for starters) that from the standpoint 
of my putative “idea” would appear to be contingent. But in the case both of small revisions (better 
saying what I mean) and of large ones (figuring out what I mean), to realize my idea successfully does 
not mean to execute a program previously decided upon. Indeed, the idea does not have an effective 
separate reality, only an ascriptive, immanent one. (Only apparently paradoxically, immanent and 
ascriptive are in this case aspects of the same idea. I will return to this apparent paradox in my response 
to Thorne, below). 
The problem with the conception of art as something cranked out of an idea-machine is that, in 
Archias’s words, it bypasses “the form’s ability to work with or through or adapt to the contingencies of 
materials and genre,” which is “a criterion for its trustworthiness as a form.” This is both true and crucial. 
The cognitive dignity of art—whether it any longer exists in “its highest vocation,” as Hegel insisted it 
did not (Vorlesungen 25, Aesthetics 11)—hinges on whether the successful negotiation with some 
resistant matter in hand—anything from functional harmony to the French Revolution—can serve as, in 
Robert Pippin’s words, a “sensuous-affective marker of truth” (135).1 Or, as Archias puts it, what 
“happens in an artist’s engagement with physical materials is essential to its thought.” This is under-
theorized in Autonomy, which is why Archias writes of the eloquence of form’s interaction with 
contingency in order to oppose it to my own insistence that “these [contingent] aspects must be clearly 
‘subordinated to the logic of the work.’” (The “clearly” is Archias’s, by the way, not mine). But there is 
no opposition between Archias’s statement and my own.  
Archias writes that “quality must be placed on an equal footing with idea,” and if I understand her 
correctly she means by this also that contingency and form must be placed on an equal footing with 
each other. In reading Archias’s response I have come to regret my frequent recourse in Autonomy to 
the language of domination and subordination in this context, but they were always meant as 
approximations of Hegelian Aufhebung: “these contingent aspects,” I meant to say, “must be 
 
1 Translations from Hegel (Vorlesungen) will be mine, with references to the Knox translation (Aesthetics) provided. 
The movement from formal to real subsumption 
is a real dynamic but only an ideological fact: the 
shift from Adorno’s claim for the artwork’s “dual 
character” to the claim that the artwork is a 
commodity like any other. The insistence on 
judgment and interpretation is not exactly a 
weapon, since what an artwork can compel (a 
conviction) is different than what a job action 
can compel (a behavior). But a successful job 
action depends on convictions. Both oppose, but 
in different ways, the universal commodification 
of human life. 
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aufgehoben by the logic of the work.” There is nothing I can do about that now; but that aside, I do not 
think Archias is as committed to such “equal footing” as she insists she is. It is undoubtedly true that 
negotiation with contingency, struggling with a matter in hand, cannot be perceived, much less judged 
to be successful or not, much less come to bear cognitive weight, if it disappears into the form. Put 
another way, form immediately loses its power if it appears to be imposed on the material from without, 
if the work of art appears to emerge from an idea-machine. But Archias also insists that artists shape 
or frame their contingent materials in a way that “calls for interpretation.” This implies that those 
materials are, in the work, essentially related to the work in a way they were not before. Raw materials, 
by definition, do not call for interpretation: “found (or otherwise uncontrolled)” materials do not, as 
simply found or uncontrolled, mean anything. (Alternatively, they can be made to bear an indefinite 
number of meanings, which is the same thing). Only within the work do they mean something 
determinate. This does not mean that they cease to be legible as having been found or in some other 
way left to their contingent development. But what it means to be legible as anything at all (rather than 
simply being what they are) is to bear a meaning; in the work, they are other than they were; they are, 
in the terms I used in Autonomy, subordinated to the logic of the work.  
What does this look like when brought to bear on Charles Ray? On both Archias’s and my account, 
form must operate with, as Hegel says of human action in general, “a light touch,” a “ruse” (in Hegel’s 
unpleasantly gendered description, a feminine quality that might nonetheless tend to counteract the 
agonistic language that predominates in Autonomy) if it is to convince us that something is being 
revealed of the matter in hand. I think what Archias is pointing to, insightfully, is that such ruses are 
characteristic of Jørgen Leth’s genius, in a way that they are not characteristic of Ray. It is worth noting 
that of the pieces exhibited at the Charles Ray show to which Archias and I both refer, the ones I thought 
were most powerful (Hinoki, Unpainted Sculpture, and Tractor) were the ones that are least well 
described by Archias’s astute description of the sculptural mode that dominated the exhibition. 
 But consider Ray’s 1986 Ink Box. It looks like a solid black plexiglass cube, three feet to a side, 
but it is actually a five-sided steel box open at the top, painted glossy black with automobile paint and 
filled precisely to the rim with black ink. We are dealing with a domination of materials that appears 
almost cartoonish in its gratuitousness: you might depict a box with ink, but ink does not look like a 
box. The similarity with Tony Smith’s Die (six feet to a side) is obvious and intentional. Ink Box’s relation 
to other such “minimalist cubes” is of course parodic: it looks like a shiny black cube, but it is not, it is 
a box filled with ink. In other words, it is depictive: in a sense, drawn with ink. If Die is stubbornly and 
mutely the object that it is, Ink Cube is illusionistically something other than it is, and also, in its 
reference to Die, clearly about that difference.  
Why, if the reference is primarily to Die, are the dimensions exactly half those of Smith’s sculpture? 
So you can touch the top: better, since it is in a museum and you cannot touch it, so you can want to 
touch it. Why? Because you want to verify that if you did you would stain your finger and the surface 
would shimmer glossily in concentric circles. What it depicts would dissolve into what it is. The tension 
between idea and material is, in Ink Box, not immediately legible in the sensuous materials of the 
sculpture, but rather becomes insistent through a cognitive operation that is—and herein lies the genius 
of the piece—no less sensuous, and no less material, than the ink and steel and paint. Ray’s raw material 
in Ink Box is not primarily the steel, ink, and paint; it is you, or better, “your own feelings.” This is the 
contingent reality that Ray cannot dispense with or dominate but can only “turn aside with a light touch.” 
Rather than being “alone with our own feelings,” we are, with Ray and with everyone else who 
encounters the sculpture on the terms on which it insists, acutely aware of the dialectical interplay of 
the literal and depictive. Better, “our own feelings” turn out not to be ours at all, but, for a moment, 
“subordinated to the logic of the work.” 
Although it is not the focus of her essay, Archias retains, I believe, the skepticism of her initial 
question: “Is the right strategy not to confidently defy spectacle with what it thinks it has killed?” The 
answer is not “no.” Institutional or para-institutional buffers against the anonymous market—restricted 
fields in the Bourdieusian sense—persevere here and there against the onslaught of the market. We are 
participating in one right now. Artistically ambitious jazz musicians, subsidized by session work outside 
the field, have managed to retain important aspects of a restricted field; what we call classical music 
has subsisted on patronage for four hundred years. Constantly under threat from the anonymous 
market, restricted fields are nonetheless not residual phenomena; they are precariously liberated 
territory. Alisa Weilerstein and Christian McBride can confidently go on doing what they are doing not 
because their work is not a commodity; rather they can confidently go on doing what they are doing 
because an institutional or para-institutional relation to the market means that in the work, the problem 
of the relation to the market does not have to come up. It is important to emphasize that this is not for 
immediately sociological reasons, but for normative reasons that respond to sociological conditions. 
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What you hear at the Vanguard does not count as jazz because it is at the Vanguard; rather, you go the 
Vanguard to hear music that understands itself, and is understood, to contribute to the idiom. Once you 
are there, you are supposed to decide for yourself. This contribution is a claim made by the music, a 
claim that is immanent to, indeed identical with, the music itself. The claim to be a contribution to a 
normative field—something that commodities, for reasons Archias seems to grant but that I will return 
to later, ordinarily cannot be—is not made possible on the basis of externality to the market, but is 
rather the artwork’s account, under the normative conditions that pertain to artistically ambitious jazz, 
of its relation to the market. 
The problem Autonomy is meant to answer, however, is how works of art can insist on a meaning 
“after modernism”; that is, after restricted fields are no longer credited as deflecting the commodity-
character of art; when works of art are understood to confront the market directly as commodities; 
when, in short, aesthetic production is understood to have “become integrated into commodity 
production generally.” Musically, what happens on a good night at the Vanguard or at the CSO is more 
substantial than what happens in a good White Stripes song. But what happens at the CSO and the 
Vanguard does not produce helpful answers to the problem of Autonomy, because it does not have to 
ask it. 
Absent an institutional mediation—a mediation that is present, even if not thematized, in the work 
itself, which has somehow to claim its place in the restricted field—the violence exerted by the 
anonymous market is immediately present. Once one has entered that force field, there is no easy way 
out; if one is acting in defiance one is no longer proceeding according to immanent exigencies. This is, 
again, not because art must ultimately be bought and sold. “Rather,” altering Hegel’s words a little, “our 
whole spiritual formation is such that the artist herself stands within a world thus characterized by the 
commodity form, with all that entails. No artist could, merely by resoluteness and force of will, abstract 
herself from it.” (Vorlesungen 25, Aesthetics 11. Hegel is talking about reflection, not the commodity 
form). Art that denies its imbrication with the market is, no matter how ugly, just selling you a pretty 
story; art that fails to account for its imbrication with the market is selling you something else. 
Uncharacteristically, at the end of her comments on Ray, Archias takes up a deflationary, anti-
interpretive stance toward his work: the imbrication of art with the market—which exists—becomes a 
reason not to understand it as art. But where imbrication with the market is understood to be universal, 
every artwork must presumptively contend with this stance. While there may be family resemblances 
among the possible answers artists might devise to counter the challenge to meaning posed by the 
market (Autonomy tries to name a few), there can be no prescriptive or a priori understanding of what 
such ruses might look like. (As Fredric Jameson points out in his response, Autonomy proposes a 
diagnosis, not a program). The point is rather that artists have no choice but to devise them. A 
commitment to craft—mammal hair in a Disney film—is usually nothing more than a professional 
commitment to good work product. But a commitment to craft—Prince’s “Kiss”—can also be so emphatic 
that it stands as a rebuke to the good work product that surrounds it.2 But such commitment to craft is, 
in its opposition to good work product, itself a version of “performing [the work’s] imbrication with the 
market,” another ruse to claim meaning while making its way in a market that forecloses it. 
 
Tim Lanzendörfer begins by saying he thinks my account of genre is wrong; he ends, if I am not 
mistaken, by saying that my account of genre is right. Obviously I prefer the latter stance. More soberly 
put, I thank Lanzendörfer for formulating explicitly what is merely implicitly, and therefore 
inconsistently, the account of genre that operates throughout the relevant chapters of Autonomy. 
Lanzendörfer is right to point out that my account of genre is thin. From the standpoint of Autonomy, 
genre is not in itself of interest. Genre is only of interest when artworks make it of interest. (Genre in 
the robust sense of an aesthetic solution to a historical-representational problem, developed in Georg 
Lukács and notably in Roberto Schwarz’s recently translated To the Victor Go the Potatoes, is not 
presently at issue). For this reason the account of genre that counts in Autonomy is the one made by 
the work itself; prior, external accounts are from that standpoint irrelevant. This is because genre is an 
ascription, one that customers and critics and network executives make, but also one that artworks 
make. Autonomy is about how artworks exist when a direct relationship to the market would tend to 
render their existence impossible. The “desire to preserve distinctions between literary fiction and genre 
 
2 “Kiss” displaced Falco’s “Rock Me Amadeus” for the number one Billboard spot in April 1986. For a dramatic 
illustration of craft as a rebuke to good work product, see Prince’s guitar solo on “While My Guitar Gently Weeps” at 
George Harrison’s induction into the Rock & Roll Hall of Fame. (www.youtube.com/watch?v=6SFNW5F8K9Y). Prince 
knows exactly what he is saying; everyone else on stage does too, and most of them do not like it. Dhani Harrison, 
to his credit, is into it. Having been born in 1971 is another contingency to be negotiated. 
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fiction” in “literary writers who adopt popular genres” (Rosen)—a phenomenon represented in Autonomy 
by Cormac McCarthy—is not a mode of making art possible; it is only an appeal to a different market 
niche.3 The attempt to make genre fiction “literary”—in itself therefore always an attempt to “preserve 
distinctions”—involves a disavowal of genre that can only be made in bad faith: it is, in a word, kitsch. 
Artworks can only make genre of interest—apparently paradoxically, asserting a moment of autonomy 
from genre—when their internality to the genre is unreservedly avowed. The claim that a time-travel 
flick can have only one of two endings might be true (I think it is), it might even be a more or less rigid 
constraint on the genre, but it is also—so goes my argument—a claim that The Terminator makes, and 
the film can only make it on the basis of having made the logically prior but temporally simultaneous 
claim that it is itself a time-travel flick. Someone might come along and make a film that has time travel 
in it but that does not end in one of those two ways, and that might be a time travel film and it might 
not, and it might make a claim about the time travel genre (it might make the time travel genre of 
interest) or it might not. It might just be a shite movie. (Looper). You have to watch it and figure it out.  
Since we are dealing with normative claims and not, in Jeremy Rosen’s phrase, “established but 
variable recipes” (which, to be clear, do exist), there is no essential distinction to be drawn, from the 
standpoint of Autonomy, between the “materiality of the canvas” and the “non-materiality of both 
harmonic resolution and of genre fiction.” They are both material in that they present artists with real 
constraints, and they are both non-material in that these constraints are normative all the way down. 
Easel painting does not have to be a thing, and the flatness of the canvas does not have to be a crucial 
problem for it. But if you are an aesthetically ambitious mid-century painter, you are going to have 
either to take on the problem of the flatness of the canvas, or make a really good case, in your painting, 
that there are more important problems.  
 
Fichte begins his nova methodo by asking readers to “Think of anything at all, the wall for example” 
(29). There is nothing obviously self-referential in such straightforward, object-directed mental activity. 
But in short order Fichte produces from it, in ovo, the entire self-reverting structure of consciousness 
as he understands it. Thinking about the wall requires a previous distinction between subject and object, 
an “I” to do the thinking; since the “I” is not a positive feature of observed reality, such a distinction 
requires that the “I” must already have been posited. “Thus, in this very act of consciousness, I posited 
myself as both the subject and the object of that same consciousness… I simply posit myself” (30-31). 
The self-reverting structure of consciousness is simply presupposed in any conscious activity, and this 
is true whether or not it is present to mind in that activity. 
Christian Thorne makes the potentially perspicuous observation that Autonomy gravitates toward 
works that can be described as having a reflexive relationship to their own status as artworks and 
commodities. “Simple self-referentiality,” he writes, is Autonomy’s “most basic requirement.” If Fichte’s 
“simply” (schlechthin, not einfach) and Thorne’s “simple” are the same, then Thorne gets this right. But 
such a “requirement” is not exactly prescriptive and certainly not a personal preference. Rather, it 
describes a structure of entailment that is best summed up in a kind of future perfect: works that 
successfully suspend their own commodity character will be found to have produced an account of their 
own status as artworks and as commodities, whether or not that awareness is present to mind as we 
experience them. This structure embodies what Adorno called the “dual character” [Doppelcharakter] 
of artworks. On one hand, art is a simple “fait social” (351). That is, in the “total exchange-society” 
(335) that Adorno saw as the secret tendency of societies like ours, and which is the avowed ideology 
of the now-teetering center-right consensus, the artwork is just a commodity. But at the same time, for 
Adorno, an artwork, by being “formed according to its own immanent law… silently denounces… a state 
of affairs that tends toward a society characterized entirely by exchange, in which everything serves 
some heteronomous purpose [literally, “everything is merely for another”: in ihr ist alles nur für anderes, 
which might also be translated, much more loosely but still faithfully, as “everything is condemned to 
be merely useful”] (335). In short, “the work of art takes up as its object its own relation, as an object, 
to empirical society” (335). If we think of the artwork as an active taking-up of its own empirical 
situation, such doubleness is going to be built in, and for the same reason that consciousness for Fichte 
always bears the structure of self-reverting activity: “Every representational act is an act of self-positing” 
(Fichte 31). The Terminator can only make a claim about the time-travel genre because it has already 
posited itself as a time-travel flick. But it is not as though The Terminator is formally very similar to, 
say, Spike Jonze’s and Charlie Kaufman’s Adaptation. Nor, conversely, can self-referentiality serve as 
any kind of formal guarantee of such Adornian doubleness: latter-day Star Wars movies are self-
 
3 See Brown, Autonomy 93-95. 
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referential, but that is just part of the limited pleasure they produce; that is, self-referentiality in Star 
Wars movies is nothing more than a moment of their heteronomy, being-for-another, or use-value.  
Other than that, Thorne seems, even at the sentence level, to have understood surprisingly little of 
Autonomy. A catalogue of instances where Thorne has misconstrued my argument, at times so 
spectacularly as to court a suspicion of bad faith, might be cathartic for me but would be deadly boring 
for everyone else. So I will try to restrict myself to a few of the areas where Thorne gets things wrong 
not about Autonomy, but about the world.4 
The first of these is his understanding of meaning, which he equates with use: “A Thomas McCarthy 
novel has no advantages in this regard over a tube sock or a travel mug, and Brown can only believe 
that it does by arguing repeatedly, contra Marx, that it is usefulness, not doubleness, that makes 
something a commodity.” Thorne forgets for a moment that the logic according to which use-value is 
the necessary and sufficient condition for exchange, and therefore the necessary and sufficient condition 
for a product’s commodity-character, is abundantly available in Marx. “The only condition for [a product] 
to be stamped as a circulating member of the world of commodities is that it actually have a usable 
form, a use-value” (Marx 430).5 Marx’s point is that in societies whose metabolism takes place by means 
of the market, any use-value will immediately take the form of a commodity. That’s all.  
This means, as Thorne correctly notes, that it also immediately has an exchange value. To realize its 
exchange value, a product must have a use; for a product to be socially ratified as useful, it must be 
exchanged. But the dual character of the commodity is not the dual character of the artwork, because 
meaning is not the same as use. The reason for this is simple. Meanings are normative ascriptions. Uses 
are not. Meanings are not a special kind of use, but something other than use.  
When I first moved to Chicago, the street vendors on Maxwell Street used to hawk cheap tube socks 
in one hand and cheap pornography in the other. You might disapprove of the implied use for tube 
socks, but it would be weird to say that customers misunderstood tube socks, that their account of the 
tube sock was unconvincing, that they mistakenly ascribed to tube socks a use they do not have. They 
simply found a new use for tube socks. But we can and do insist that novels can be misunderstood, that 
a person’s account of a novel can be unconvincing, that a student or a colleague or a friend can ascribe 
a meaning to a novel that it does not have. A novel of course also has a use and therefore is 
exchangeable: it has the ordinary doubleness of the commodity. But it is also has the dual character of 
the artwork insisted upon by Adorno. Adorno and Brecht agree at least on this, that works of art are 
capable both of having a use (e.g. entertainment) and of being about that use. Brecht, not I, made the 
observation that in Mahagonny fun is also an inquiry into fun. I only said it was also true of a White 
Stripes song. If you really think meaning is identical with use, then you think that all readers of a novel 
are entitled to their own private meanings just as all buyers of tube socks are entitled to their own 
private uses, and in that case literature professors and seminars really are useless. As far as the 
commodity-character of the artwork is concerned, that is not wrong. But if you believe that is all there 
is to it, then there is nothing further to talk about. Other people’s interpretations will be as little relevant 
to you as other people’s dreams.  
Autonomy is the translation into the aesthetic domain of Hegelian “negativity”: the fact not that 
artworks (or artists) are free from external circumstances, but that precisely those external 
 
4 Oh twist my arm. If I were going to make such a catalogue I would begin with places where Thorne ascribes to 
me ideas that are the opposite of the ones I affirm (his “the position of the working class… [is] now filled by quality 
television and smart novels” vs. my “unlike unions… works of art have no political efficacy of their own” [37]; 
similarly with the idea that “the old paths still work, that new ones aren’t needed”; at one point he even ascribes to 
me an idea opposite to my own that is apparently his, namely that “we search art for the possibility of our 
freedom,” while what I say is that “the work of art does not promise emancipation” [181]); or where he ascribes 
ideas to me that are clearly marked in the text as belonging to someone else (“the confusion in which everything is 
lost” [135] being a paraphrase of Caetano Veloso’s lament, cited at length on the previous page, that musical 
innovations in Brazil become “lost in the confusion” [134] of the market); where he makes false characterizations 
of my argument (as when I am supposed to “roll my eyes over Avatar because of some dumb thing its director 
once said in an interview,” when in fact the dumb thing its director repeatedly said in interviews confirms that he 
knew and acknowledged what my analysis otherwise shows); or when he dramatically misses the point (“The 
autonomy that he is after is thus not our autonomy from an insinuating system but the artist’s autonomy from us”: 
well, yes, because when the insinuating system is the market, and we are customers, then the insinuating system 
is us). Not strictly belonging to the list would be a few instances of pure bizarrerie, as when there is supposed to be 
some relevant confusion about Autonomy’s relationship to Italian autonomia.  
5 “Das Produkt des individuellen Kapitals, d.h. jedes selbständig fungierenden, mit eignem Leben begabten 
Bruchstücks des gesellschaftlichen Kapitals, hat irgendeine beliebige Naturalform. Die einzige Bedingung ist, daß es 
wirklich eine Gebrauchsform hat, einen Gebrauchswert, der es zu einem zirkulationsfähigen Glied der Warenwelt 
stempelt.” 
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circumstances are actively taken up by artworks (or artists) in ways that are irreducibly normative; that 
is, that are in their very being—before any judgment or interpretation—subject to judgment and 
interpretation. (Anyone’s judgment and interpretation. Professional critics, exegetes, and theorists like 
Thorne and myself have a role to play, but I cannot see how that is problematic or even not 
uncontroversially true.) Thorne asks, “When irony comes to us in the form of the commodity, can we 
be sure that the commodity always loses”? This is symptomatic. First, the commodity always wins: the 
work of art can only, rarely and with difficulty, suspend the sovereignty of the commodity form within 
the artwork itself. What that suspension means is simply that it can plausibly claim to mean something. 
But that is a claim; it is subject to judgment and interpretation, which are moments of each other. Not 
to the action of formal magic bullets. 
Meanwhile, I am intrigued by Thorne’s detour into Kant but not persuaded of its relevance. The 
chassis Autonomy is built on is not Kant’s account of aesthetic judgment, but an account meant to revise 
and displace it, namely the thoroughgoing reorientation of the Kantian terms that Hegel (whom, despite 
Hegel’s centrality to the book, Thorne does not once mention in his critique) accomplishes in the 
beginning of his Lectures on Fine Art. Hegel’s redescription of aesthetic judgment is entirely of a piece 
with his general stance with regard to the Kantian system; it is operative throughout his Lectures; it 
informs a great deal of subsequent Marxist thinking about literature and the arts; and it does all the 
work that Thorne accuses me of not doing. I explain it on pages 12-13.  
What Hegel introduces there, a basic dialectical concept of whose pertinence Thorne seems, once 
again, momentarily to have lost sight, is the category of immanence as it applies to art. Thorne thinks 
we have two choices: autonomy belongs to the artwork, or it belongs to the artist. If it is the latter, the 
artwork is a “telegram” of the artist’s intention, and we do not need the artwork. If it is the former, the 
artist’s intention looks like an external demand, and we do not need intention. Both versions assume 
that intention is external to action. I suggested above, in agreeing with Archias’s assessment of a certain 
model of conceptual art, that this picture of intention is unsatisfactory. Intention is what makes 
something an action; intention is immanent to action. When we ascribe meaning to a work of art, we 
ascribe intention to the artist. That’s it.6 This is one aspect of what the category of immanence means 
in the dialectical tradition. And indeed this aspect, which is quite orthogonal to Kant’s interest in beauty, 
is crucial to Hegel’s redescription of it, enabling the whole subsequent body of his lectures (not to 
mention Autonomy and a great deal else besides). “The beautiful… exists as purposive in itself, without 
means and purpose [that is, artwork and intention, materials and meaning] showing themselves as 
different, severed sides” (Vorlesungen 87, Aesthetics 59). Kant’s “purposiveness without purpose” has 
been redescribed as purposiveness without external purpose. That is, Hegelian beauty is purposiveness 
whose purpose is entirely immanent to it: purposiveness with a meaning (an internal end), but not a 
use (an external end). The whole mare’s nest of problems that Thorne is determined to explore 
evaporates at a stroke. Things get a little more complicated, since there is some ambiguity in Hegel’s 
lectures as we have them about whether he is talking about a real unity of form and content or merely 
the appearance of unity. But everything we know of Hegel suggests that he should be talking about a 
real unity, and whatever the case, I am talking about a real unity: one that is, as always, ascriptive, 
that is, one that is a determination of judgment and interpretation and therefore subject to dispute. It 
is also precisely in such unity that Archias (and if I am not mistaken, Durão) find not a guarantee but 
an index of potential artistic value: a “criterion for [the] trustworthiness [of] a form.” What this looks 
like in practice might be modestly suggested by the latter part of my response to Myka Tucker-
Abramson, below. 
Categories like “middlebrow,” meanwhile, do not mean anything. Or rather, they do not mean 
anything important; they are still the class markers they always have been, and they can be used to 
throw shade up or down the scale of consumable goods. When modernist institutions were understood 
to protect artworks from the demands of the anonymous market, one could be forgiven for thinking that 
“highbrow” stood approximately for something like that, and “middlebrow” stood approximately for the 
more aspirational reaches of the anonymous market. (The word “middlebrow” itself seems to date from 
the mid-1920s, precisely in the context of aspirational culture consumers failing to catch on to modernist 
developments). In the period immediately preceding high modernism, it was commonplace for ambitious 
artists to lament the access they perceived their predecessors to have had to a large and general 
audience; suspicion of such ambitions only makes sense in the modernist period, when a restricted field 
 
6  This is true (in fact, more visibly so) even when we judge that an artwork has failed to realize its intention. This 
is what makes immanent critique possible. It is also true when the artist’s intentions are not on all fours with each 
other, when history ironizes for us what the artist intended, and so on. This gets complicated, but not very. See 
Brown, Autonomy 11-12, 82, 91-102. 
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has been established. But today we understand that art cannot escape the pressure of its commodity 
character. Again, this not because everything must be bought with cash but because “no artist could, 
merely by resoluteness and force of will, abstract herself from” the pressure exerted by the universality 
of commodity exchange. Contemporary aesthetic ideology, correctly grasping that commodity exchange 
is the mode in which things come to count as socially existing in capitalist societies even when they do 
not circulate immediately as commodities, insists that artworks are not only commodities, but 
commodities like any other. (The time when the internet looked like a lever for decommodification was 
brief and anomalous, and is now twenty years behind us. The period when the internet looks like a lever 
to monetize formerly enjoyably gratuitous activities like your cat or your sex life has already lasted 
longer). When we acknowledge this, we acknowledge that the line between art and non-art runs not 
between different classes of consumers but through art itself; only the work of judgment and 
interpretation can make the distinction. (As we have seen, even works produced in a restricted field 
confront this problem in a different form). “Kitsch,” Adorno wrote, is “a poison that contaminates all art” 
(239). To put it another way: Dude, relax. It’s all dad rock. 
 
It is with some relief that I turn to Marina Vishmidt and Fabio Durão. Not so much because they seem 
to agree with some of the major claims of Autonomy, but because in doing so they situate the book in 
ways I had not thought to do, draw implications I would not have been able to draw, and bring to the 
center lacunae that had been, at best, in my peripheral vision. They each, if I understand them correctly, 
offer one substantial critique, and I have responded elsewhere to slightly different versions of them.7 
Here, I will only acknowledge that each of them points to a real weakness in the book. For Durão, 
Autonomy “fails to fully unpack the main implication from its own findings, namely that autonomy is not 
only the precondition for the work to stand on its own… but a vehicle for the production of new 
knowledge, in its most emphatic form a kind of knowledge that could not be obtained otherwise.” This 
is simply true. The only adequate response would be to try to follow in the direction that the criticism 
points, namely toward the recuperation of the cognitive dignity of art. This would consist in, on one 
hand, the theoretical justification for the claim that art in its “highest vocation” is not “a thing of the 
past,” and on the other, the extension of the interpretive line, running from Hegel to Lukács to Roberto 
Schwarz, that cashes out this claim. Meanwhile, I do not think Vishmidt is quite right to endorse, as she 
seems to, the idea that “there is no space left for an autonomy of the subject,” at least in the specific 
sense I have used the word “autonomy.” Disagreements like this one could not take place without 
autonomy in that specific sense. But if I understand her correctly, her main point is that Autonomy has 
no more substantial conception of a Left politics than “join your union and support the expansion of 
public goods.” I share Vishmidt’s impatience, but I do not have an answer for it. “Public goods” would 
have to be fleshed out to include full employment, a living wage, universal access to healthcare and 
education, expansion of collective labor rights, environmental security, freedom from discrimination, 
and other long-established social-democratic goals, but such goals can be thought of coherently not as 
reformist measures but as a real step on a long march. This is in part because they constitute a Left 
program that will make life better, in part because history is pedagogy and even in the medium run 
capitalism will not be able to accommodate them. If I am not mistaken, the relative obscurity of 
Vishmidt’s final sentence suggests that promising concrete alternatives are not thick on the ground.  
 
Myka Tucker-Abramson’s sympathetic and wide-ranging critique deserves a sympathetic and wide-
ranging response. But if I wanted proleptically to sum up mine in a sentence, it would be this: There is 
no reason to view joining a union as an alternative to disappointingly modest claims for the direct 
political effectivity of art. First, obviously, because one would presumably join one’s union anyway. But 
also because the reasons one would want to join a union are the very reasons one ought to be suspicious 
of readily consumable political art. If one is concerned about the violence exerted on workers by the 
labor market, one might reasonably be expected to be concerned about the pressure exerted on meaning 
by the cultural market.  
The claim of Autonomy is that artworks call for judgment and interpretation, and that this call itself 
is under violent assault from the hegemony of the market, which is objectively hostile to judgment and 
interpretation. (That is the point of the invisible hand’s invisibility). It is then not quite right to say that 
I “dismiss outright any potential of political commitment and aesthetic form working together.” 
(“Working together,” however, might be taken to suggest that they are separate in themselves, as 
though form were the packaging and political commitment the product it contains; if so, that would be 
 
7  See Brown, “Things Recognized Without Having Been Seen,” along with the critiques that essay responds to, at 
nonsite.org. 
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a problem for obvious reasons). The point is that political art too must plausibly solicit interpretation if 
it is to avoid deflation into a mere consumable sign. Like Archias and Thorne, Tucker-Abramson, who 
claims that for me “art is only recognized as art insofar as it speaks directly to the market,” perceives a 
prescriptive impulse where there is none. Since acute readers are reaching this conclusion I must take 
responsibility for it, but the point was never that artworks cannot take on state violence or immiseration 
if they like. The point is that, one way or another—explicitly or implicitly, entailed or presupposed—they 
have to take on their commodity status whether they like it or not.  
For this reason the problem of autonomy is relevant to all the works Tucker-Abramson mentions as 
outside of Autonomy’s admittedly narrow scope. Boots Riley’s Sorry to Bother You is extraordinarily 
suggestive in this regard and would certainly have been included in the film chapter if I had seen it in 
time.8 The Uncomfortable Dead’s four-handed technique might be a gimmick, or it might be a successful 
ruse to turn the mapping effect of the detective novel toward a compelling account of Mexican history 
in the shadow of the Dirty War. Deciding which of these is the case is the work of judgment and 
interpretation. But if The Uncomfortable Dead is understood to be automatically good because it has a 
congenial account of Mexican history in the shadow of the Dirty War, then “political commitment and 
aesthetic form” are seen as “working together” precisely as separate elements, and that would be bad 
criticism. (To be clear, I am not suggesting that Tucker-Abramson makes or would be sympathetic to 
anything like this claim; I am rather pointing out what it would mean for The Uncomfortable Dead to be 
outside the scope of Autonomy’s problematic, rather than simply outside the field of its objects). Bad 
criticism because all it could say about the work is that it conformed to an external standard, which is a 
low bar not only critically, artistically, and theoretically, but also politically. But also bad because such 
criticism is, despite seeming to make a judgment (but in fact only making a mechanical determination), 
non-normative: any container will do as long as the message it contains is congenial. It coincides 
therefore with our common sense, which holds that novels are not entities that solicit interpretation, 
but things that have a use.  
This common sense is an ideology in Roberto Schwarz’s precise phrase: “an illusion well-grounded 
in appearances” (18). It is not false that a declining rate of profit forces capital to search out 
opportunities for exploitation in every nook and cranny of human experience. But the redescription of 
this political-economic phenomenon as the ubiquitous ontological claim that, in Dave Beech’s skeptical 
words, “art is, always has been, or has recently become nothing but a commodity” (1)—is precisely 
what Autonomy (with Beech) is arguing against. For this reason, the problem of whether Marx’s technical 
description of the logic of the “real subsumption of labor under capital” can be adopted as a theory of 
culture is interesting but largely irrelevant.9 Culture is not immune from the real subsumption of labor 
under capital in the strict Marxian sense. Unions can directly oppose this dynamic with varying degrees 
of success. (For example, the Broadway musician’s union, AFM Local 802, has been engaged in a 
decades-long struggle to constrain the shedding of musical labor made possible by an increase in the 
organic composition of capital in the theater industry—that is, it opposes replacing musicians with ever 
more sophisticated music sequencing software). Artworks themselves, not so much. They have no 
material levers to operate. But they can register their struggle against an “impossible situation.” The 
movement from formal to real subsumption is a real dynamic but only an ideological fact: the shift from 
Adorno’s claim for the artwork’s “dual character” to the claim that the artwork is a commodity like any 
 
8  The novel chapter could have been written using all twenty-first century African examples. Recent francophone 
novels like Fiston Mwanza Mujila’s Tram 83, Abdourahman Waberi’s Aux États-Unis d’Afrique, and Alain 
Mabanckou’s African Psycho are all concerned to come to terms with their status as African novels in an 
international book market, which manifests itself even the title (English in the original) of the last of these. 
Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie’s Half of a Yellow Sun would take the place in that imaginary chapter of Cormac 
McCarthy’s The Road as a pseudo-serious pseudo-solution to the impasses that status imposes, with the historical 
novel taking the logical place of modernism. Meanwhile I cannot recommend highly enough Mongane Serote’s Gods 
of Our Time and Zoë Wicomb’s David’s Story as novels that are both, though their politics are different, deeply 
political and profoundly committed to formal immanence. But I do not think the chapter would have been better 
that way. The relationship between African literature and its North American and European counterparts is nothing 
like what it was for the period discussed in Utopian Generations: the differences today tend to the quantitative and 
empirical rather than the qualitative and dialectical. Establishing this would have added another layer of 
complication, without adding anything to this analysis, though it certainly merits working out somewhere else.  
9  There is no reason that Tucker-Abramson should be expected to know this, but I do address elsewhere the 
scholarship skeptical of whether “Marx’s use of ‘real subsumption’ itself can be derived into a theory of culture.” 
There is an inside-baseball version of the irrelevance of the real subsumption problem, having to do with the 
different but dialectically related mechanisms Marx proposed for the tendential subsumption of human activity into 
commodity production; for this I refer readers to Brown, “What We Worry About When We Worry About 
Commodification.” 
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other. The insistence on judgment and interpretation is not exactly a weapon, since what an artwork 
can compel (a conviction) is different than what a job action can compel (a behavior). But a successful 
job action depends on convictions. Both oppose, but in different ways, the universal commodification of 
human life.  
Tucker-Abramson astutely infers my likely objection to finding political possibility in the erosion of 
the “barriers between art and life.” When “life” is life under late capitalism, the erosion of barriers 
between art and life is just more late capitalism. When utopia is on the political horizon, as it was during 
the Commune (my example in Autonomy is the Brazilian left in the early 1960s; in Utopian Generations 
it was the Soviet revolution and the African anti-colonial movements), then the project of making art 
immanent to life—that is, not to present life, but to a redeemed future life—is yes, absolutely, utopian. 
That specific social situation is the history, not just the context, in which vanguard aesthetics and 
vanguard politics coincide. That situation does not much resemble ours. As described by Tucker-
Abramson, Groys’s version of this argument, apparently grounded in the loopy idea that the “modern 
class structure” is that “everybody has to work and everybody has some leisure,” is best passed over 
quickly, and the best way to pass over it quickly would be to point out that if YouTube stands both for 
Seymour’s feared fascism and Groys’s hoped-for communism, that’s because YouTube just embodies 
the logic of the commodity, which provides what the customer is looking for. Artworks, whether they 
compose or cut and paste or cite or frame or use any other procedure or set of procedures, differ from 
this logic, because they solicit a taking of sides.  
This being the case, Tucker-Abramson understands, like Archias, that any theoretical differences that 
matter are going to have to cash out in competing interpretations; for this reason perhaps the best way 
to clarify our differences will be to focus on a work about which Tucker-Abramson and I apparently 
disagree, namely The Wire. Tucker-Abramson does not have the space to offer a full-dress reading and 
it would be unfair to judge her remarks by that standard. In attempting to get her to switch sides, I will 
only point out a few aspects of her reading that seem significant. It may be that we have different ideas 
about what constitutes interpretation, and if so I would like, if possible, to get her and others to see the 
virtues of mine. 
If I am not mistaken, Tucker-Abramson accepts my reading of the historical substance of The Wire 
as “civil society’s failure to confront the ‘shedding of labor.’” There are four aspects of the show, 
however, that Tucker-Abramson finds problematic. First, representational inadequacies: not enough 
police violence, not enough grassroots activism. Second, there is a narrative focalization on institutions, 
namely tattered state institutions and a stevedore’s union that is fading into obsolescence, and for whose 
midcentury world not only characters but the show itself is said to be mourning. Third, the show gets 
its mapping work done through a voyeuristic reliance on surveillance technology, which “prepares and 
conditions its viewer to support the… security state.” Fourth, we are reminded that the show’s 
commitment to institutions (“state-centered politics”) takes place during the militarization of the carceral 
arm of the state.  
What unites all of these aspects is that, even when they are “formal,” they are not mediated by the 
form of the whole. That is, the emphasis is not on what they mean—because they mean anything at all 
only as mediated by the form of the whole—but rather on what they are. The show’s plot—what gets its 
surveillance apparatus going in the first place—depends on the criminalization of drugs; but the show 
itself is committed to depicting the effects of that criminalization in all their destructive absurdity. 
Decriminalization, on the other hand, is depicted as a positive and even Utopian possibility 
(Hamsterdam). It would be hard to claim that The Wire supports the intensification of the war on drugs. 
But if this is on my view a pretty solid claim, it is an interpretive one. The fact that the emphasis on 
state institutions coincides temporally with a moment when state carceral institutions are being 
militarized (but also privatized!) is supposed to take the place of interpretation, or throw suspicion on 
the interpretation offered. But that is just context, not history. History enters the work of art not by the 
procedure of relating the work to facts chosen from the infinite web of potentially relevant data, but as 
the material on which it works. The material on which The Wire works is the postindustrial city; that is, 
in concentrated form, social life under a capitalism where the tendency to shed labor has begun to be 
felt as a crisis. The criminalization of drug use is understood by The Wire as a disastrous technique for 
managing the effects of shed labor, that is, a repressive instrument for managing the reserve army of 
the unemployed. The intensification of that logic could only be an intensification of its disastrous 
character. In other words, the very logic of the show opposes the militarization of the police.  
But there is no reason to trust me on this when we can just watch the show and decide for ourselves. 
When, in the final episode of the first season, a SWAT team is assembled to arrest Avon Barksdale, they 
are viewed with contempt by both the criminals and the cops (“delta-force motherfuckers” to one, “boys” 
breaking out “toys” to the other). As the SWAT team prepares to enter, McNulty and Daniels, without 
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military-style gear and with weapons holstered, call them off and, in a scene so quiet (and deliberately 
anticlimactic) as to be almost intimate, arrest Barksdale without incident. The implication is that military-
style equipment is not a necessary instrument of public safety (and it is worth noting how much The 
Wire is an outlier here, since in cop shows of every stripe the militarized wing of the police is almost 
universally represented as not only necessary but glamorous, visually exciting, and narratively climactic) 
but rather an instrument of violence, whose insistently marked gratuitousness in practical terms can 
only suggest that it serves instead a repressive spectacularity.10 
We on the Left have every interest in being skeptical of the notion that we are passively “conditioned” 
by what we watch on TV. It seems to me profoundly anti-dialectical, insisting that we are influenced 
directly (affectively?) by what we see, not by what it means: as though Romeo and Juliet would condition 
us to tolerate suicide, rather than produce for us the image of love as a loss of self in another so total 
that all other social strictures fade to nothing. Narrative focalization is, meanwhile, in itself merely a 
formal feature among others; the question is: what does this narrative focalization do, how does it work? 
The institutional focus in The Wire is in the service of a tragic logic: institutions that can no longer handle 
the contradictions they were designed to mediate end up hastening their own demise. The implication 
is that these institutions can only survive by changing themselves radically: the police by creating a safe 
space for addicts instead of enforcing drug laws; the union movement by including everyone 
(“Everybody needs a union”), most significantly the reserve army of the unemployed (the dead eastern 
European economic refugees, destined for the sex industry, who “needed a union”). Perhaps The Wire 
can be fairly characterized as mournful. But certainly—in its very form—it is not committed to a politics 
of nostalgia. The only way The Wire would count as nostalgic is if mediating institutions like unions were, 
as such, thought to be a thing of the past. That view exists but I do not believe Myka Tucker-Abramson 
subscribes to it. 
Finally, representation can never do justice to the object represented. That things are left out of a 
representation is not in itself informative. The question is rather: what do these representations mean? 
Why are things represented one way and not another? It’s true that “no kids from the projects ever die 
in custody in the show,” but if memory serves, very early in the first season a kid from the projects is 
blinded after being pistol-whipped by one of the main cop-characters, named Prez; Prez’s colleagues 
and his commanding officer cover up his misconduct and he suffers no similarly life-altering 
consequences. Is Prez’s fearful and aggressive, out-of-control policing exceptional or synechdochic? 
Such questions can only be answered by relating these representational elements to the movement of 
the whole. If we are concerned mainly with bad and good representations, we are, again, in an 
undialectical universe where we are concerned mainly with unmediated elements that match or fail to 
match ideas we already have about the entity represented. The relative lack of grassroots organizing in 
The Wire is seen to be a problem because we already know that grassroots organizing is important. 
Someone with different ideas about grassroots organizing will have a different judgment about its 
relative lack in The Wire. It can readily be seen that The Wire is completely redundant to this operation. 
Differing beliefs preceded the work, and survived it unchanged. A meaning, however, to return to Fabio 
Durão’s point, proposes something new, and opens it to judgment. If it does not, then indeed we might 
as well become sociologists. 
The last two sung notes of The Song of the Earth (pianississimo, “ewig!”), an E followed by a D in 
the key of C, do not in themselves even make a melody, in other words they appear in hundreds of 
melodies. (The first repeated “alright” in the Beatles’ “Revolution”; but also “Mary” in their “Let it Be”; 
“homeward” in “Golden Slumbers”; “pillow” in “Carry That Weight”; “would you lock” in “When I’m Sixty-
Four.” And so on.) But at the end of the song cycle these two notes are so shattering because they, 
astonishingly, hold precariously in their threadbare subsistence the remains of everything that came 
before. If there are no formal magic bullets, there are also no thematic poison pills. Maybe security 
cameras on TV are bad, because they condition us to the security state. Maybe security cameras on TV 
are good, because they reveal to us that the security state is already here. As unmediated elements, 
there is no reason to prefer one version over another. The two statements do not even disagree, they 
just see the matter differently. To relate them to some particular whole is formulate an account of what 
they mean; to formulate an account of what they mean is to offer an interpretation; to offer an 
interpretation is to make a claim about which we can disagree.  
 
10 For the moment, a clip of this scene is available on YouTube: www.youtube.com/watch?v=XaysD0qByUo. The 
sense of anticlimax, with McNulty apparently wanting to go back to ask Stringer Bell a question but giving up on 
the impulse, is so palpable as to reflect back on the whole season: it is clear that all of the effort the cop 
protagonists (and we) have been engaged in is pointless, since Barksdale, or for structural reasons if not him 
someone else, will be back. 
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A program like the expansion of public goods or the extension of labor rights and union membership 
can be understood as a step on a long march only if they are understood as sites of class struggle, as 
opposed to, for example, the management of politically or ethically unsustainable wealth differentials. 
The choice between Medicare for All and Obamacare is, for the center-right, a technocratic debate (in 
fact, decided in advance) about which approach is likely to get the job done better. Capitalism, in the 
form of the insurance industry, is understood simply as a special interest that will make a public option 
too difficult to pursue. If, on the other hand, we understand Medicare for All as a substantial 
decommodification of a sector of the U.S. economy and a democratically popular sectoral refusal of the 
logic of capital accumulation, then the opposition of the insurance industry appears as an object lesson. 
Similarly, the complacent or conservative appropriation or containment of a potential “poetics of 
postmodernity” is a danger. But if the vocation to make art, and to interpret it and judge it as art, is 
understood as essentially engaged in a life-or-death struggle with the commodity form, then such 
aesthetic ideologies will have to be seen as, like Schiller’s reworking of Kant, ideological mystifications. 
If Fredric Jameson’s parting admonition is not to get comfortable with postmodernity, his most 
serious one for the author of Autonomy, and the note I will end on, should be familiar: Always historicize! 
If in Autonomy I lean too frequently on the pseudo-category of the “contemporary” (I do) and use 
“postmodernism” sparingly (I do) this is not because one is meant to substitute for the other, though in 
retrospect I recognize the danger. To the contrary, the early and crucial invocation of Jameson’s 
Postmodernism is meant to establish his periodization as the key-signature of the book as a whole. The 
point of deriving Friedian categories (art and objecthood) from a Marxian problematic (the commodity-
form in its tendential universality), was to provide a kind of rosetta stone that would allow one to move 
back and forth between political commitments and aesthetic ones: the opposition between art and 
objecthood is redescribed as an opposition between art and the commodity-form, an opposition that 
only has its bite in the context of the latter’s tendential universality. If you are committed to the idea 
that artworks are possible, you ought to be committed to resisting the hegemony of the commodity 
form; if you are committed to decommodification as a concrete step in a long march, you ought (insofar 
as you give the matter any thought at all, which is of course not a requirement outside of conversations 
like this one) to be suspicious of any account of art that, in denying its specificity, lines it up with the 
structure of the commodity. In other words, the struggle Autonomy tracks is that of art as, in Brecht’s 
phrase, a “foreign body” within postmodernity.  
If art has a real but for it unassailable enemy in the commodity form, it also has a proximate, 
ideological enemy, namely the post-1968 anti-dialectical theoretical counter-revolution and its American 
appropriation, whose “spinozist” suspicion of meaning evacuates Adorno’s “dual character” and performs 
the ideological service of theoretically aligning the newly non-specific structure of the artwork with the 
structure of the commodity. If art is (like everything else) an ensemble of affective relations, or (like 
everything else) a social precipitate, or (like everything else) a nexus of human and non-human 
“agency,” then it is (like everything else) a commodity. A submerged argument—no doubt too 
submerged—in Autonomy is that postmodernism itself is characterized by a “struggle between 
philosophers and artistic producers.” If in this struggle the victorious camp among the philosophers 
plays a counterrevolutionary role, the role artists play is far more complex: among the pasticheurs have 
been those determined to turn aside the logic of postmodernity with a light touch. If there has been, 
within Jameson’s Marxist demarcation of a postmodern era, a “contemporary” acceleration and coming-
to-consciousness of this dynamic, this appears first as historical only in a Hegelian, not a Marxist sense: 
a shift from quantity to quality, from in-itself to for-itself. But the deepest Hegelian wager is that the 
world is intelligible because real relations are logical relations and vice versa. The apparently idealist 
phase-change within postmodern culture must then be seen in terms of the suddenly evident 
bankruptcy—as we reap the whirlwind unleashed by capitalism’s more than half-century of successful 
offensives—of the ideological cousins of “spinozist” philosophizing, namely third-way politics and the 
center-right economic consensus, both of which have run up against limits that are nothing if not 
material.  
In the face of this crisis of postmodernity, which has already dragged on long enough to be called 
late postmodernity, a “return to aesthetics” is of course neither desirable nor possible. But Autonomy 
does, as Durão notes, call for a certain return to the aesthetic. Such a call should not be taken to endorse 
renewed attention to an ahistorical essence, but rather to say that it is for historical reasons—precisely 
in the crisis of postmodernity—that the radical origins of the aesthetic, to which Jameson aptly calls our 
attention, become relevant in a new way. The invention of the aesthetic—developed over no more than 
thirty years between the Critique of Judgment and Hegel’s lectures on fine art—is essentially related to 
the invention of politics in the French Revolution, a relation that is mediated by the working-out of the 
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manifold consequences of the Idealist breakthrough that Marx is heir to, namely the discovery of 
consciousness as an active principle in a world not of its own making. When the commodity form 
achieves a real hegemony and ideological universality, grounded in the desperate effort to squeeze 
surplus value out of every nook and cranny of human activity, then the insistence on judgment and 
interpretation, operations hostile to the commodity form, acquires for the first time a politics of its own. 
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